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argued his actions fell under both of these exceptions. The Government, however, argued that the CWA's "recapture" provision trumps the exceptions in
this case. The CWA recapture provision requires that, even if farmers' normal
activities and irrigation maintenance are exempted, they must obtain a discharge
permit if such activity brings an area of the navigable waters into a new use that
impairs water flow. Hamilton presented testimony that prior landowners used
the filled portions of the Creek for farming activities. The court concluded that,
given this evidence, it was still disputable whether the land Hamilton filled was
previously farmland and, therefore, whether the recapture provision applied.
Accordingly, the court granted the Government's request for summary judgment in part and found that the Creek is a water of the United States. However,
the court denied the Government's request for summary judgment on the applicability of the CWA's recapture provision.
Lauren Hammond
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Pawnee Well Users, Inc. v. Wolfe, 320 P.3d 320 (Colo. 2013) (holding the
water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule
because the General Assembly granted the State Engineer the authority to adopt
rules governing nontributary groundwater extracted during oil and gas production, and the State Engineer can neither establish nor divest himself of statutory
authority).
This case was an appeal from a final judgment issued in Colorado District
Court, Water Division 1 ("water court"), which found that the Tribal Rule
stripped the Office of the State Engineer ("State Engineer") of the authority to
enact the Fruitland Rule and, thus, the Fruitland Rule was invalid. The State
Engineer, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe ("Tribe"), and several other intervenors appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado ("Court").
In Vance v. Wolfe, the Court held that water extracted during the course of
coalbed methane ("CBM") production was subject not only to Colorado Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC") regulations, but also to both
the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 and the Colorado Ground Water Management Act ("Ground Water Act"). The Court's
holding in Vance required the State Engineer to evaluate and potentially issue
permits for more than 40,000 existing oil and gas wells within sixty days of the
decision.
To alleviate the situation, the General Assembly passed House Bill 09-1303
("H.B. 1303"), which gave the State Engineer authority under the Ground Water Act to adopt rules to administer the "dewatering of geologic formations by
withdrawing nontributary groundwater to facilitate or permit mining of minerals." H.B. 1303 also afforded the State Engineer additional time to evaluate the
wells and issue permits.
The State Engineer held public meetings and then filed a notice of proposed rule making. The notice of proposed rules included the State Engineer's
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intent to designate certain geologic formations as nontributary, which would
mean that the groundwater within those formations would not fall within the
state prior appropriation system. The notice of rulemaking allowed interested
parties to propose alternate rules. The Tribe and various oil and gas operators
proposed a rule that identified groundwater in the Fruitland Formation, which
extended into the Southern Ute Indian Reservation ("Reservation"), as nontributary. This rule ultimately became the Fruitland Rule.
Because the Fruitland Rule included land inside and outside of the Reservation's boundaries, jurisdictional issues arose. Accordingly, the Tribe proposed the Tribal Rule, which stated that the rules "shall not be construed to
establish the jurisdiction of either the State of Colorado or the Southern Ute
Indian Tribe over nontributary groundwater within the boundaries of the Southern Ute Indian Reservation...." The State Engineer agreed to adopt the Tribal
Rule but maintained that the State Engineer already possessed jurisdiction over
nontributary groundwater within the Reservation.
The State Engineer then filed the final Produced Nontributary Ground Water Rules ("Final Rules"), which included the Fruitland Rule and the Tribal
Rule. After the State Engineer had enacted the Final Rules and had already
completed evaluations for wells in the Fruitland Formation, interested citizen
groups and owners of vested rights ("Pawnee Well Users") filed complaints in
six water divisions challenging the validity of the Final Rules. The Multidistrict
Litigation Panel consolidated the complaints in the water court.
The water court upheld all of the Final Rules except the Fruitland Rule,
which it found invalid. The water court found that (i) the Tribal Rule divested
the State Engineer of his authority to enact the Fruitland Rule, (ii) the State Engineer was not authorized to issue the rule as an advisory rule, and (iii) the State
Engineer needed to obtain a judicial determination of his authority in order to
enact the Fruitland Rule. The State Engineer, the Tribe, and other intervenors
appealed.
The Court first addressed whether the Tribal Rule divested the State Engineer of authority to enact the Fruitland Rule. The Court held that the water
court erred on this issue, reasoning that the Tribal Rule could not take away the
State Engineer's statutory authority to promulgate the Fruitland Rule. The
Court explained that the State Engineer could neither establish, nor take away,
his own jurisdiction because the State Engineer is a state agency that only has
the powers that the legislature expressly gives it. Therefore, only H.B. 1303,
not the Tribal Rule, gave authority to the State Engineer, including the authority
to enact the Fruitland Rule.
The Court subsequently set aside the remainder of the water court's order
that dealt with the Fruitland Rule. First, the Court disagreed with the water
court's holding that the Fruitland Rule was "advisory" based on the absence of
authority given to the State Engineer by the Tribal Rule to enact the Fruitland
Rule. The Court'reasoned that the Fruitland Rule was not "advisory" because
H.B. 1303 specifically granted the State Engineer the authority to promulgate
the Fruitland Rule. Also, the Court rejected the water court's conclusion that
the State Engineer must obtain a judicial determination of its authority in order
to enact the Fruitland Rule because the Tribal Rule could not-and therefore
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did not-divest the State Engineer of his statutory authority to promulgate the
Fruitland Rule.
The Court also rejected Pawnee Well Users' argument that the State Engineer may fail to administer nontributary water on the Reservation because the
Tribal Rule divested the State Engineer of his jurisdiction over nontributary
ground water within the reservation. The Court rejected this argument on the
grounds that, logically, the State Engineer would not delineate nontributary
groundwater with the Fruitland Rule only to decline to administer it by promulgating the Tribal Rule.
Accordingly, the Court held that the water court erred in invalidating the
Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule and reversed and remanded the case
for further proceedings. In a footnote, the Court pointed out that a party could
still bring an as-applied challenge to the State Engineer's implementation of the
Fruitland Rule.
Brock Miller
YellowJacket Water Conservancy Dist v. Livingston, 318 P.3d 454 (Colo.
2013) (holding the Water Conservancy Act's holdover provision, containing neither temporal nor reasonableness requirements, allowed district's holdover directors to remain in office past their original term as de jure officers with authority to act on behalf of the district).
The YellowJacket Water Conservancy District ("YellowJacket") held conditional water rights to several bodies of water located in northwest Colorado.
Yellow Jacket's board of directors met on September 29, 2009, and authorized
the filing of diligence applications with the water court. On the date of the meeting, YellowJacket's board of directors, normally a nine-member panel, had one
vacancy as well as four directors whose terms had expired but who were still
performing their official duties pending the appointment of qualified replacements. After reviewing Yellow Jacket's diligence applications, several parties
(hereinafter "Livingston") objected to the board's authority to approve the filing
of these documents. Livingston argued that Yellow Jacket could not have assembled a valid quorum because only three of the nine directors were serving
unexpired terms on the date of the board meeting. Livingston filed for summary
judgment asking the Rouyt County District Court, Water Division 6 ("water
court") to cancel YellowJacket's conditional water rights.
Although the water court recognized that Colorado's Water Conservancy
Act ("WCA") contained a holdover provision, the court relied on case law from
other states to find that the four holdover directors had remained in their positions for an unreasonable amount of time past the expiration of their terms.
The four holdover directors' terms expired on October 18, 2008, nearly one
year before the board meeting. Consequently, the court found that Yellow
Jacket's board had not assembled a valid quorum and lacked the authority to
approve the filing of the diligence applications. The water court granted Livingston's motion for summary judgment, deeming Yellow Jacket's conditional water rights abandoned and cancelled.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court ("Court") began its analysis by
reviewing the purpose and procedure of WCA. In order to maintain a conditional water right, the holder is required to file an application for a finding of

